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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the implications of the United States'
bombing of Iraq in 1993 on the United States' war against Iraq
("Iraqi War") in 2003. Although there are a variety of implica-
tions, this article specifically focuses on the doctrine of anticipa-
tory self-defense. After the 1993 bombings occurred, there was
* 2004 J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law; B.A. in Psychology
and Sociology from Rutgers University. I would like to thank my editor, Meredith
Denecke as well as the Associate Candidates for their efforts in bringing this com-
ment to publication.
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a considerable amount of articles written about how the United
States had broadened the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
by justifying the bombings under this doctrine. However, the
effect of the bombings on future United States' military actions
has not been explored.
In March 2003, the United States declared war against
Iraq. The United States justified the war based on Iraq's sus-
pected development of nuclear and biological weapons and its
suspected involvement with terrorist organizations. Based on
this information, the United States believed that it would be
attacked by Iraq or that Iraq would support an attack against it
in the future. The United States' war against Iraq, therefore,
was based on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
This article attempts to determine if the United States'
bombings of Iraq in 1993 broadened the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense to the extent that the United States had a basis
under international law for its war against Iraq in 2003. Sec-
tion I summarizes the law of self-defense and anticipatory self-
defense by examining two areas of international law: customary
international law and Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter.' This summary establishes the framework under which
both President Clinton's 1993 bombing of Iraq and the Iraqi
War will be analyzed. Section II discusses President Clinton's
actions against Iraq. This section begins with an introduction
of the factual background of the 1993 bombings on Iraq and
then examines the scholarly analysis of the bombings. The sec-
tion focuses on President Clinton's justifications for the attack
and determines whether his attack was permitted under the le-
gal framework established in Section I. Section III examines
President George W. Bush's perspective on anticipatory self-de-
fense as outlined in his State of the Union Address in 2003 and
his congressional documents. This section examines President
Bush's involvement with the United Nations ("U.N."). Section
IV discusses the implications of President Clinton's 1993 bomb-
ing of Iraq on the 2003 Iraqi War by focusing on three areas:
international support, the United Nations, and the scope of the
strikes. Section V draws some conclusions as to those
implications.
1 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
[Vol. 16:193
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss1/8
2004] DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE 195
II. THE DOCTRINES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND ANTICIPATORY
SELF-DEFENSE
A. Self-Defense in Customary International Law
The doctrine of self-defense must be explored before the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense can be understood. The
concept of self-defense in international law began with propo-
nents of natural law theory. Natural law theory suggests that
self-defense was an inherent right and was an integral part of
defining war.2 Some scholars suggest that Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter reflects this natural right by using the
term "inherent right."3
The early notions of natural law theorists aided in the de-
velopment of the theory that a country's right to self-defense is
a necessary component of its power in the world. 4 This theory
holds that law cannot govern the right to self-defense when
there is a grave threat to the power of a state or its way of life. 5
What constitutes a threat is determined by the state that per-
ceives the threat. The United States has supported this theory
in the past. Upon signing the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of Renun-
ciation of War in 1928, the United States declared that a state
"alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require re-
course to war as self-defense." 6
Contrary to both natural law theorists and power theorists,
other scholars argue that a country's right to self-defense is not
above the law and should be regulated to some extent. For ex-
ample, Hersch Lauterpacht, a historian, believes that the initial
decision of whether to use force based on self-defense should be
made by the states. 7 However, unlike power theorists, Lauter-
pacht believes that the state's right to self-defense is relative,
2 Maureen F. Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Re-
sponse, and the Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1197
(1999). A state's preservation of itself was a natural right that could not be con-
trolled by positive law. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 135 (Boston 1991).
3 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 135.
4 Id. at 136.
5 Id.
6 SCHACTER, supra note 2, at 136 quoting J. Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris,
213, 214 (1928) (quoting U.S. note of June 23, 1928).
7 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 136.
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not absolute.8 In other words, this right is "regulated to the ex-
tent that it is the business of the courts to determine whether,
how far, and for how long, there was a necessity to have re-
source to it." 9 According to Lauterpacht's theory, an objective
judicial body makes the final determinations as to the legality
of a state's actions, rather than the subjective judgment of a
state. 10
The tension between these opposing theories exists not only
in academia, but also in the international judicial bodies. Lau-
terpacht's theory received support in the Judgment of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1946.11 The
German Nazi leaders argued, "Germany had acted in self-de-
fense and that every state must be the judge of whether, in a
given case, it has the right of self-defense."1 2 The Nuremberg
Tribunal rejected that argument, holding that, "whether actions
taken under the claim of self-defense were in fact aggressive or
defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation or adjudi-
cation if international law is ever to be enforced."' 3
However, in the 1980s, the United States began to formally
express its adherence to the power theory of self-defense. 14 In
Nicaragua v. United States,15 the United States argued that it
alone was in a position to determine the necessity of the defense
measures it had taken against Nicaragua.16 Although the In-
ternational Court ruled against the United States on other is-
sues, the United States' argument began to establish the basis
for its rejection of the Court's jurisdiction. The United States
believed it had a right to refuse to submit claims to the Interna-
tional Court based on national security concerns.' 7 "The United
States position has been interpreted as rejecting any external
8 Id. at 137.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 137 (quoting Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1946. Trial of German Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, 208 (1947)).
14 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 137.
15 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27).
16 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 136.
17 Id. at 137-38.
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authority to judge the legitimacy of American defense mea-
sures, a position that would contradict the idea of self-defense
as a right defined by law."' 8
Regardless of whether the determination is made by a state
or a judicial body, there are three elements to the doctrine of
self-defense that exist in customary international law: neces-
sity, immediacy, and proportionality. 19 The necessity and im-
mediacy requirements are less controversial than the
requirement of proportionality. 20 The principle of necessity re-
quires a country to explore the peaceful resolutions to a threat
before relying on the use of military force. 2' No other practical
alternative to counterforce may exist. 22 The principle of imme-
diacy involves the requirement that the defensive acts must be
immediately subsequent to the armed attack.23 However, this
requirement often receives liberal treatment. For example, in
the Falkland Islands Conflict in 1982, a month went by before
British forces counterattacked. 24
Many scholars consider the element of proportionality as
the single most important limitation of a state's right to self-
defense.25 "Self-defensive measures must be proportionate to
the seriousness and scope of the attack. Since retaliation and
punitive actions are not permitted, the actions are restricted to
those necessary to repulse an attack."26 Accordingly, the main
effects of proportionality are to inhibit an escalation of the con-
flict and to discourage reprisals, i.e., a country's response after
an attack that is punitive in nature. 27
The measurement of what defensive measures constitute a
proportionate attack has led to controversy. Some scholars be-
lieve that the measurement of proportionality cannot be judged
simply by comparing body counts. 28 However, as the number of
18 Id. at 138.
19 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE 1167 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed.,
1995).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1168.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1167.
24 See Wolfrum, supra note 19.
25 Id. at 1168.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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injuries and deaths to non-combatants increase in a defensive
measure, there is often a claim afterwards that a defensive
measure was disproportionate. 29 This is especially relevant
when considering self-defense actions against terrorists. Since
many terrorist bases have been located in the middle of cities,
the areas surrounding the bases often contain non-combat-
ants.30 Countries that engage in aerial bombing are often con-
fronted with the claim that the attacks would be
disproportionate to the terrorist attack because of the
probability of non-combatant injuries and deaths.31
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Self-defense is a response to an attack, whereas anticipa-
tory self-defense comes before an attack and is designed to miti-
gate harm.32 Emmerich de Vattel, a philosopher, formulated a
doctrine that represents the prevailing view of most early
scholars:
A nation has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to make
use of force ... against whoever is actually engaged in opposition
to her, and even to anticipate his machinations, observing, how-
ever, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain suspicions, lest
she should incur the imputation of becoming herself an unjust
aggressor. 33
The writings of scholars were transformed into legal doc-
trine with an incident in 1837 that has become known as The
Caroline Case.34 This involved an attack by British soldiers on
an American ship, the Caroline, which was being used to trans-
port supplies to a rebellion in Canada against Britain.35 When
the British government claimed self-defense, Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, sent a diplomatic communiqu to the British
that laid out the parameters of anticipatory self-defense: "neces-
sity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
29 SCHACHTER, supra note 2, at 154.
30 Wolfrum, supra note 19, at 154.
31 Id.
32 Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, 19 YALE J. INT'L. L.
455, 477 (1994).
33 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1195, 1197.
34 Smith, supra note 32, at 479.
35 Id.
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means, and no moment for deliberation." 36 From this state-
ment, scholars have proposed that necessity, immediacy, and
proportionality be the basic requirements for the doctrine of an-
ticipatory self-defense.
The existence of these elements in customary international
law is undisputed. The controversy arises when the following
question is posed: Does Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter37 differ from customary international law? In other words,
does Article 51 incorporate the custom of anticipatory self-de-
fense? Article 51 provides that, "[niothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."38 The
basic issues surrounding this text are:
[Wihether the drafters of the Charter intended to limit the pre-
existing right to only cases of armed attack; whether the armed
attack may be interpreted in some instances as threats of immi-
nent attack; or whether the Charter merely sets out to state the
rule concerning a particular case, but does not purport to limit all
cases of self-defense. 39
Scholars are split on these issues and their positions are
generally characterized in one of two ways. First, some scholars
narrowly interpret Article 51 due to two provisions of the
United Nations ("U.N.") Charter that prohibit the use of aggres-
sive force and ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes.40 Arti-
cle 2(3) states that, "[a]ll Members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace, security, and justice, are not endan-
gered."41 Article 2(4) provides: "[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the
36 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1205.
37 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, supra note 1.
38 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1199.
40 Id.
41 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
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United Nations."42 From these provisions, scholars suggest the
overall goal of the Charter is the restriction on the use of force.
Furthermore, these scholars look to the plain language of Arti-
cle 51. They suggest that anticipatory self-defense no longer ex-
ists under Article 51 because of the clause "if an armed attack
occurs."43 In their view, the anticipation of a threat, regardless
of the necessity, imminence, or proportionality, cannot be justi-
fied because Article 51 requires that an armed attack needs to
occur in order to justify a military response based on self-
defense.44
Second, some scholars offer a broad interpretation of Arti-
cle 51 and argue that it does not restrict the pre-existing ele-
ments of anticipatory self-defense, but rather preserves them.45
In support of their argument they make three points. First,
they assert that the negotiating history, or the Charter's
travaux preparatoires, incorporate the entire customary law of
self-defense. 46 Second, they assert that since the Security
Council has approved of certain countries' anticipatory actions,
then the U.N. interprets Article 51 to incorporate the customary
elements. 47 For example, the Security Council's response to the
1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1981 Israeli raid on Tuwaitha, and
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, suggests that some forms of an-
ticipatory self-defense are allowed under the Charter.48 The
U.N.'s response to these situations may have established that
provocative weapons systems had to actually be deployed by a
country in order for the attacking country to justify anticipatory
self-defense. 49 Third, they argue that the Charter is "pre-
atomic" and that a narrow interpretation would not reflect the
realities of the advanced weapons used in war.50
The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States examined the relationship between the Charter and cus-
42 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, supra note 1, para. 4.
43 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, supra note 1.
44 Smith, supra note 32, at 481.
45 Id.
46 Thomas K. Plofchan, Article 51: Limits on Self-defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L.
336, 343-50 (1992).
47 Smith, supra note 32, at 492-94.
48 Id. at 481-92.
49 Id.
50 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1205.
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tomary international law. 51 The Court addressed the United
States' claim of self-defense in an action brought by Nicaragua
in response to the United States' support of rebel forces. 52 The
United States maintained that the customary right and the
Charter right of self-defense were identical, but that the court
should not base its ruling on customary law since both parties
in the action were parties to the Charter.53 The Court dis-
agreed by holding that, "the Charter does not supervene cus-
tom, but exists alongside the customary law, and [the Court]
believed the two sources were not substantively identical."
54
The Court decided the case on the basis of customary interna-
tional law and held that the United States' actions were illegal
when it engaged in direct attacks against Nicaragua and
trained, armed, supported, and financed Nicaraguan rebel
forces. 55
III. THE UNITED STATES' BOMBING OF IRAQ IN 1993
A. Factual Background
In 1993, the United States fired twenty-three tomahawk
missiles on Iraqi military outposts. 56 The Clinton administra-
tion stated that the attack was in response to an Iraqi plot, sup-
ported by Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, to assassinate
former President George Bush while he visited Kuwait. Secret
Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") went to Kuwait to collect evidence
on the assassination plot.5 7 The administration concluded that
an assassination plot existed based on intelligence reports and
51 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 15.
52 Id.
53 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1199.
54 Id.
55 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 15.
56 Ryan C. Hendrickson, Article 51 and the Clinton Presidency: Military
Strikes and the U.N. Charter, 19 B.U. INTL L.J. 207 (2001); see Thomas L. Fried-
man, Raid on Bagdad: An Assessment: The Missile's Message, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1993, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, June 28, 1993; see also
Douglas Jehl, U.S. Convinced Iraqi Saboteurs Plotted to Kill Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1993, at A5 available at LEXIS, The New York Times, May 8, 1993; Bar-
bara Vobejda, Clinton awaits probe of Bush Death Plot, WASH. POST, May 9, 1993,
at A14.
57 Alan Surchin, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the
June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 459-61 (1995).
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on a trial in Kuwait, which convicted the Iraqi assassins for the
conspiracy to assassinate George Bush. 58 Critics of the attack
claimed the administration's evidence was weak and
circumstantial. 59
In support of the attack, President Clinton told Congress
that the United States had an inherent right of self-defense as
recognized in Article 51.60 Madeleine Albright, Secretary of
State, further supported this right at an emergency meeting of
the Security Council of the United Nations. 61 Although Ms. Al-
bright did not ask the Council for formal approval of the attack,
she argued that member states might regard an attack against
a former leader as an attack against the state itself and react
accordingly. 62 Thus, she concluded that an attempted attack on
a former President was as an attack on the United States,
which gave the United States the right to respond directly
under Article 51.63
"The majority of Security Council members accepted the
United States' position that the raid was a justified act of self-
defense."64 "Many members cited the evidence presented to
them as a reason for their support."65 These members viewed
the attack, "as either a necessary response to terrorism or as an
unavoidable result of a threatened assassination."66 For exam-
ple, the British Prime Minister viewed the attack as a justified
act of self-defense because of the "intolerable situation created
by a threat against former President Bush's life."67 Belgian
Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Claes cited Article 51 when
maintaining, "retaliatory measures were justified since the U.S.
government had sufficient evidence to implicate Iraq in the as-
sassination plot."68 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl labeled
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Hendrickson, supra note 56, at 213.
61 Surchin, supra note 57, at 465.
62 Id. at 459-61.
63 Id.
64 Hendrickson, supra note 56, at 214.
65 Surchin, supra note 57, at 465-70.
66 Id. at 465.
67 Id. at 467 (citing Chris Moncrief, Major Gives Full Backing for Attack on
Baghdad, F.B.I.S., June 28, 1993, at 9).
68 Id. at 468 (citing William Claes, Baghdad Attack "Clear Signal" to Serbia,
F.B.I.S., July 2, 1993, at 10).
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the action as a "justified reaction to a detestable attempted act
of terrorism."69 However, other foreign countries were critical
of the United States' assertion of a unilateral right.70 These
countries asserted that the Clinton administration could have
sought Security Council approval prior to the bombing rather
than pursuing an unilateral action.7
1
B. Scholarly Analysis of the 1993 Bombings
Critics of the attack have analyzed the 1993 bombings in
relation to the elements of anticipatory self-defense found in
customary international law and have drawn two main conclu-
sions. First, the attack was unnecessary because, "no American
intelligence information shared with the public suggested that
another attack was being planned." 72 Furthermore, since the
United States did not attempt to resolve the situation peace-
fully, the attack was an unnecessary resolution to the prob-
lem.73 Second, the attack was not immediate since the plot
emerged in April 1993 and the bombing did not occur until June
1993.7 4 Moreover, they suggest that the attack was a reprisal
for the assassination plot rather than anticipatory self-de-
fense. 75 Although some scholars argue that there is a place in
international law for reasonable reprisals, this justification was
not presented by the United States to the Security Council. 76
Therefore, any chance for the Security Council to analyze the
merits of reasonable reprisals was lost when the United States
took unilateral action against Iraq.
Critics also look to the language of Article 51 where it
states, "if an armed attack occurs."77 They argue that since the
plot was discovered well before its execution, no armed attack
69 Id. (citing Helmut Kohl, U.S. Attack on Baghdad Justified, F.B.I.S., July 2,
1993, at 11).
70 Hendrickson, supra note 56, at 207, 214.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986
Bombing of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
99, 113 (1994).
74 Surchin, supra note 57, at 474-75.
75 Baker, supra note 73, at 115.
76 Surchin, supra note 57, at 487-93.
77 U.N. Charter, supra note 1.
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actually occurred. 78 They further argue that the plot was not
an armed attack by Iraq, but by terrorists who had some associ-
ation with Iraq. Therefore, they conclude that Iraq should not
have been bombed. 79
Proponents of the bombing offer a different analysis of the
elements of anticipatory self-defense. Proponents assert that
when the assassination plot is placed in the context of the over-
all international relations between Iraq and the United States,
the bombing was necessary.80 They assert that the assassina-
tion attempt occurred in the wake of the Gulf War, and that
since the War's end, Iraq had continually interfered with U.N.
inspectors, threatened allied no-fly zones, and threatened force
against its own population.81 The proponents suggest that
when the assassination plot is viewed in this context, future as-
sassination attempts were a realistic threat, and peaceful nego-
tiations were useless.8 2
Some scholars conclude that an absolute requirement of im-
mediacy in the modern world is unrealistic because it would
limit the involvement of the political branches.8 3 Thus, they be-
lieve President Clinton's delay was justifiable. With respect to
proportionality, proponents argue that the Clinton administra-
tion structured the attack as a low-intensity bombing focused
on military outposts. These scholars suggest that the low-inten-
sity of the bombing indicated that the attack was meant as a
deterrent, rather than a reprisal or punishment.8 4
Proponents analyze the language of Article 51 to assert
that in modern day warfare, terrorist attacks should be consid-
ered armed attacks.8 5 They contend that when the United Na-
tions Charter was drafted, the focus was on the traditional
concept of warfare, that is, a country's military force's need to
invade another country's territory.8 6 They suggest that the fo-
78 Hendrickson, supra note 56, at 214.
79 Id. at 214.
80 Lieutenant Commander Winthrop, Attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service
Headquarters, 1993 ARMY LAw. 45 (1993).
81 Id.
82 Surchin, supra note 57, at 474.
83 Id.
84 Winthrop, supra note 79, at 45, 47.
85 Brennan, supra note 2, at 1203-05.
86 Id.
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cus on traditional territorial invasions obscures alternative
forms of aggression that trigger the right to self-defense, such
as terrorist attacks.8 7 Proponents argue that the Security
Council should start to realize that modern day warfare in-
cludes terrorist attacks as armed attacks.88 However, even pro-
ponents of the 1993 bombing concede that since President
Clinton acted unilaterally, the United States lost an opportu-
nity to push the Security Council to adopt this expansive
definition.8 9
Although the Security Council did not have an opportunity
to judge the attack, the international community did. Stuart
Baker, an internationally recognized scholar, characterized the
international approval of the attacks as a signal of a theoretical
shift in the interpretation of anticipatory self-defense. 90 Mr.
Baker compared the international disapproval of the Reagan
administration's decision in 1986 to bomb Libya with the 1993
bombings of Iraq.91 He suggested that there were significant
factual similarities between the two bombings. He specifically
pointed to the fact that neither Libya nor Iraq was engaged in a
current, on-going armed attack against the United States.92 He
explains the difference in the international reaction by arguing
that in 1986, the international community had a restrictive
view on anticipatory self-defense, whereas in 1993, the interna-
tional community had a very expansive definition of anticipa-
tory self-defense. 93 Mr. Baker contemplated the effects of this
expansive definition when he stated:
Whether future legal historians will remember the 1993 Iraq air
strikes as the moment when the world decided to take a stand
against terrorism, or as the moment when the international law
fatally loosened its grip on the wild forces of international insta-
bility, will be determined in the years to come."94
87 Id.
88 Surchin, supra note 57, at 487-89.
89 Id. at 475-76.
90 Baker, supra note 73, at 99, 115.
91 Id. at 111-13.
92 Id. at 111-12.
93 Id. at 110-13.
94 Id. at 116.
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IV. THE IRAQI WAR
A. President George Bush's Perspective on Anticipatory
Self-Defense
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Centers, the Bush administration declared a War on Terror-
ism.95 In doing so, President Bush wrote that, "[olur immediate
focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and
any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to
gain or use weapons of mass destruction or their precursors."96
In achieving this goal, the Bush administration depends on the
right of anticipatory self-defense:
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the sup-
port of the international community, we will not hesitate to act
alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting
preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing
harm against our people and our country...97
Moreover, it is important to note that the Bush administra-
tion recognizes the debate on whether terrorist attacks should
be considered armed attacks:
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the le-
gitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat -
most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.
Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conven-
tional means . . . Instead they rely on acts of terror and, poten-
tially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can
be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning
... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.98
95 See Todd S. Purdum, After the Attacks: The White House; Bush Warns of a
Wrathful, Shadowy and Inventive War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at Al; see also
David Sanger, Bush orders Heavy Bombers near Afghans; Demands Bin Laden
now, not Negotiations, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al.
96 President's Letter to Congress on the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, 6 (Sept. 14, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/printl
nssall.html.
97 Id.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
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President Bush began applying the right of anticipatory
self-defense to Iraq when he stated in his State of the Union
Address that Iraq was one of the countries that made up the
"axis of evil."99 As to the threat posed by Iraq, he stated that,
"Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to
support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop an-
thrax, nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade." 100 He
also intimated that the United States would act unilaterally by
stating, "I will not wait on events while danger gathers. I will
not stand by as peril draws closer and closer."10 '
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the idea that Iraq
could present a threat seemed realistic. However, in the sum-
mer of 2002, when the Bush administration began to more seri-
ously consider preemptive strikes against Iraq, the once
imminent threat posed by Iraq seemed distant to the interna-
tional community.10 2 In an attempt to build support for the pre-
emptive strikes, Bush made two speeches in which he
specifically discussed why Iraq was a threat. 0 3 In both
speeches, President Bush outlined the Iraqi threats: (1) contin-
ued repression and violation of human rights; (2) failure to re-
turn or account for prisoners of war; (3) continued state support
for terrorism; (4) stockpiling and developing weapons of mass
destruction, that is, biological and chemical weapons and nu-
clear long-range missiles; (5) violating economic sanctions; (6)
evasion of U.N. inspection demands; and (7) violation of several
U.N. resolutions. 10 4
President Bush's focus on Iraq culminated in two important
resolutions. The first was a joint congressional resolution enti-
99 President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), http:ll
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1l.html [last visited Jan.
2004]; See Karen DeYoung, Bush Lays Down a Marker for 3 'Evil' States, WASH.
POST, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See David Sanger, Bush asks Leaders in 3 Key Nations for Iraq Support,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at Al.
103 See President Bush's Speech on the Use of Force (Oct. 8. 2002), http://
www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcriptlindex.html) [last visited
Jan., 2004]; See also President Bush's Iraq Speech to the United Nations (Sept. 12
2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/12/national/printable521781.
shtml.
104 Id.
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tled, "Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against
Iraq."10 5 This resolution gave President Bush the following
authority:
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United
States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order
to - (1) defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.10 6
The second was an U.N. resolution entitled, "Resolution
1441."107 This resolution stated that Iraq was in material
breach of its obligations to the U.N. because of Iraq's failure to
comply with previous resolutions.108  The resolution decided
that Iraq needed to provide the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission ("UNMOVIC"), and
the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"), with "imme-
diate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to
relevant Iraqi facilities and officials.' 0 9 Along with this unfet-
tered access, Iraq needed to provide UNMOVIC and IAEA with
a declaration that described "all aspects of its programs to de-
velop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. . . ."110 Based
on the above information, UNMOVIC and IAEA were requested
to provide reports to the Security Council as to Iraq's coopera-
tion, truthfulness, and the status of Iraq's weaponry."' From
these reports, the Security Council was required "to consider
the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the
relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international
peace and security." 1 2 Finally, the most controversial clause of
the resolution provided, "the Council has repeatedly warned
Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its con-
tinued violations of its obligations."1 3
105 H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong., "Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002" (2002) (enacted).
106 Id.
107 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
108 Id. at 1-3.
109 Id. at 3.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 4-5.
112 See U.N. SCOR, supra note 107.
113 Id. at 5. (emphasis added).
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In the months that followed these resolutions, President
Bush gave another State of the Union Address. 114 When he fo-
cused on Iraq, he began emphasizing the fact that the United
States had been cooperating with the Security Council in the
drafting of Resolution 1441.115 In the same vein, he stated that
the Iraqi government, specifically Saddam Hussein, had not
complied with the resolution, by hiding his weaponry and not
allowing UNMOVIC and IAEA to interview Iraqi scientists. 116
Finally, he catalogued the evidence against Iraq:
[B]iological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of an-
thrax ... materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters
of botulinum toxin ... materials to produce as much as 500 tons of
sarin, mustard and XIV nerve agent... 30,000 munitions capable
of delivering chemical agents ... several mobile biological weap-
ons labs . . . an advanced nuclear weapons development
program .... 117
V. ANALYSIS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1993 BOMBINGS ON
THE IRAQI WAR
In examining the implications of the United States' 1993
bombings on the 2003 Iraqi War, three areas will be examined:
international support, the United Nations, and the threat posed
by Iraq.
A. International Support
As stated above, some scholars feared that the interna-
tional community's liberal interpretation of anticipatory self-de-
fense in 1993 would cause the international community to give
deference to the United States in future attacks against Iraq.118
However, the liberal interpretation that President Clinton en-
joyed has not carried over to President Bush. The international
community currently supports a narrow interpretation. 119 On
the other hand, President Bush prescribes to a broad interpre-
114 President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html [last visited Jan. 2004].
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Baker, supra note 73, at 99, 115.
119 Sanger, supra note 102, at Al.
17
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tation of anticipatory self-defense. This is evident from his
State of Union Address on January 28, 200.3:
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent.
Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their inten-
tions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this
threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all
words, and all recriminations would come too late. 120
The international community's narrow interpretation was
evident from the beginning of the Iraqi conflict. Some countries
stressed that the United States should not have taken unilat-
eral action against Iraq.121 These countries asserted that the
United States should act against Iraq only with Security Coun-
cil approval. 122 The manifestation of the international commu-
nity's insistence of Security Council approval was the debate
involving the Security Council Resolution 1441.
From the outset, the U.N. understood that the Security
Council members needed to cooperate with each other in order
to develop an effective resolution.123 As Kofi Annan, the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, stated in his opening re-
marks to Security Council, "Unity of the Security Council is
essential, for without unity, the message going out from the
Council will not reach Iraq with full force and will not achieve
its full objective .... ,12 4 The unity that Kofi Annan sought was
among the five permanent members of the Security Council,
which are the United States, Britain, France, China, and
Russia. 125
However, a debate developed between the United States
and France that lasted for over five weeks. 126 The United
120 President's State of the Union Address, supra note 114. (emphasis added).
121 Foreign Desk, In the Council: Pleas for Unity and a Debate on Resuming
Arms Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at A18, available at LEXIS, The New
York Times, October 17, 2002.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See Julia Preston, U.S. Said to Offer France Final Compromise to End Iraq
Resolution Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at A10, available at LEXIS, The
New York Times, October 18, 2002.
126 See Steven Weisman, Threats and Reponses: Towards a Resolution; U.S.
and France Near Compromise on Action on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al,
available at LEXIS, The New York Times, October 30, 2002; see also Julia Preston,
U.S. Revises Iraq Resolution, but an Accord still Eludes it, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
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States wanted "a single resolution that would give it authority
to launch a military attack" against Iraq if it violated the reso-
lution.127 The United States believed that along with the cur-
rent Iraqi threat, all of Iraq's previous violations of Security
Council resolutions provided justification for a military at-
tack. 128 On the other hand, France insisted on a resolution that
would not authorize a military attack by the United States. 129
France wanted the resolution to require the United States to
ask for Security Council approval before attacking Iraq.130
France threatened to veto any resolution that provided the
United States with such unilateral authorization. 13 1 Russia,
China, and numerous countries in the Middle East supported
the French position, whereas Britain supported the United
States.1 32
The long debate ended with Resolution 1441 containing two
statements. As stated above, Resolution 1441 required the Se-
curity Council to review the reports of UNMOVIC and IAEA in
order to determine whether Iraq had complied.1 33 The resolu-
tion also threatened "serious consequences" if Iraq failed to
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, October 22, 2002; Foreign
Desk, Draft of a U.S. - British Resolution on Iraq and Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2002, at A10 available at LEXIS, The New York Times, October 23, 2002.
127 Julia Preston, Bush Garners Little Support at U.N. for an Attack on Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at A10, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, Octo-
ber 17, 2002.
128 Julia Preston, Bush's Step Toward U.N. is Met by Warm Welcome; Council
Seems Ready to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at All, available at LEXIS, The
New York Times, September 13, 2002.
129 See Julia Preston, U.S. and France Closer to Deal on Terms for Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A8, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, October 19,
2002 [hereinafter Closer to Deal]; see also Elaine Sciolino, France is Set of Offer the
U.N. a Separate Resolution on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at A8 available at
LEXIS, The New York Times, October 27, 2002; Steven Weisman, U.S. and France
Near Compromise on Action on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al, available at
LEXIS, The New York Times, October 30, 2002.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See Preston, supra note 129, at A8; see also Julia Preston, Shift Toward the
U.S. Stand on Iraq is Noted in Council, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A20, available
at LEXIS, The New York Times, November 1, 2002; Foreign Desk, supra note 126,
at A10.
133 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002)
[hereinafter Resolution 14411 available at http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:
ykj 1.. /iraqres.pdf(esolution+ 14418hl=en8ie=UFT-.
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comply. 134 The meaning of these two statements was debata-
ble. From the French perspective, the above statements did not
authorize the United States to use military force. 135 Rather,
the Security Council would evaluate the inspection reports and
determine the appropriate consequences.136 From the Ameri-
can perspective, the phrase, "serious consequences," meant that
it could attack Iraq.137
There are many factors that may have influenced the inter-
national community's narrow interpretation, especially in
France and Germany. First, many reports have focused on
France and Germany's economic interests in both the European
Union and the Middle East.138 With regard to the former inter-
est, both countries want to assure that they have important
roles in the European Union.' 39 As such, they want their own
perspectives on Europe's foreign relations to have a strong in-
fluence.' 40 Their roles in the U.N. are the perfect platform by
which to achieve this goal.' 4 ' The latter interests relate to the
oil supplies in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries.' 42
France has invested a significant amount of money in making
inroads into the Middle East's dominance over oil. 143 Therefore,
France does not want to offend the Middle Eastern countries by
supporting the United States in its military attacks on Iraq.'44
134 Id.
135 See Colum Lynch, U.S. Presses U.N. to Back Tough New Iraq Resolution,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at A18, available at LEXIS, The Washington Post, No-
vember 7, 2002; see also Colum Lynch, Security Council Resolution Tells Iraq it
Must Disarm; Baghdad order to admit Inspectors or face Consequences, WASH.
POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at A26, available at LEXIS, The Washington Post, November
10, 2002.
136 See id.
137 See Karen DeYoung and Colum Lynch, U.S., France Agree on Iraq; Resolu-
tion Vote May Come Today, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2002, at Al.
138 John Tagliabue, French and German Leaders Jointly Oppose Iraqi War
Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times,
January 23, 2003.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See John Tagliabue, Threats and Responses: Commerce, Europeans Strike
to Tighten Trade Ties with Iraq, N.Y Times, Sept. 19, 2002.
144 See id.
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Since France and Germany have become strong trade partners
in recent years, Germany supports the French position. 145
Second, a United States attack on Iraq may be seen as only
one part of its larger war on terrorism. Some countries may be
looking at the bigger picture, rather than focusing on the merits
of the United States' right to anticipatory self-defense. This re-
action is understandable since President Bush is the first Amer-
ican president to explicitly declare a global war on terrorism.
Although President Clinton's attacks were arguably part of a
larger war against terrorism, he never stressed this point in his
public comments on the bombing. Many countries may fear the
global reach of the War on Terrorism. Through supporting the
United States in the Iraqi War, the scope of the War on Terror-
ism may become too extensive. Finally, countries may feel vul-
nerable to terrorist attacks. 146 Not only was the world's
superpower, the United States, bombed by terrorists, but there
have been threats of terrorist attacks throughout Europe and
Asia. 147
B. The United Nations
President Bush stressed two countervailing points in justi-
fying the Iraqi War: the United States needed the support of the
United Nations and the United States had the right to attack
Iraq.148 Unlike President Clinton, President Bush sought the
approval of the Security Council before taking action against
Iraq. However, President Clinton's actions were not unique.
Many American presidents and other countries have acted uni-
laterally against other countries without the approval of the Se-
curity Council.149 These unilateral actions were often the result
of a country's belief that it had an inherent right to defend itself
against threats. 150 Even though there is merit to these theo-
ries, countries adhering to these theories cause a negative ef-
fect. The negative effect of these actions is that the Security
145 See Tagliabue, supra note 138.
146 See generally Warren Hoge, Blair Sees Iraq Weakening as France Resists
Early War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York
Times, January 23, 2003.
147 See id.
148 See Preston, supra note 129, at A10.
149 SCHACHTER, supra note 3, at 139.
150 See id. at 137.
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Council is not given a chance to proactively assess the doctrine
of anticipatory self-defense in the modern world. While the
Council may conduct a post hoc analysis of a country's unilat-
eral actions, the value of this analysis is greatly diminished
since the Council acts as an observer rather than as a partici-
pant.151 In post hoc analysis, the Council comments with ap-
proval or disapproval on a country's actions. It does not actively
participate in the initial decision as to whether anticipatory
self-defense measures should be taken by a particular country.
Therefore, many important legal and policy considerations are
being addressed and determined by the involved parties, rather
than an independent body such as the Security Council.
152
Since the Security Council is accustomed to post hoc analy-
sis in this arena, it is understandable that confusion and fight-
ing arose when its members were asked by President Bush to
act proactively and draft a resolution with regard to Iraq. Al-
though the Council has drafted numerous weapons inspection
resolutions in the past, the consequences of the current resolu-
tion and its effects on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
were unusual. The struggle between France and the United
States, involving the language of the resolution, was not only a
result of two countries' political agendas. Essentially, members
of the Council were being asked to draft a resolution that would
allow the United States to engage in anticipatory self-defense.
In other words, the Security Council had to draft a resolution
that would essentially define Iraq's non-compliance as an immi-
nent threat to the United States. This imminent threat would
then provide a justification for attacking Iraq.
Finally, President Clinton and other former presidents did
not establish a political framework from which President Bush
could build. The only framework established was that of unilat-
eral action, which provoked some of President Bush's cabinet
members, such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to seriously doubt the ability of
United Nations to develop effective resolutions. 53 Other mem-
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR (Simon and Schuster 2002); see also
Walter Pincus, Iraq Inspector Girds for a Test and Spotlight, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2002, at A18; Karen DeYoung, Rhetorical Weave on Iraq; Statement on Arms Hunt
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bers of his cabinet, such as Secretary of the State Colin Powell,
pushed for U.N. involvement.' 54 This internal strife hindered
President Bush's negotiations with the U.N.
C. The Threat posed by Iraq
President Clinton's 1993 bombing of Iraq was an example
of low-intensity warfare. 155 As stated above, this bombing was
greeted by approval from the international community. Al-
though the international community was not explicit in their
reasons for support, they may have believed that the United
States' response was proportionate to the threat posed by Iraq.
The threat may have been conceived as an assassination plot on
an American President by a terrorist organization within Iraq
that was supported by Saddam Hussein. This possible concep-
tion of the threat is precise and definite; meaning, it is easy to
identify the cause of the danger and the target. As a result, an
anticipatory self-defense measure that was also precise and def-
inite would be deemed proportional. Therefore, the interna-
tional community accepted the United States' aerial bombings
of military bases and suspected terrorist bases.
The definiteness and preciseness that defined the 1993
bombings was not found in the Iraqi War. The United States
attempted to convince others that Iraq had nuclear and biologi-
cal weapons. However, the evidence that Iraq had weapons has
been met with controversy. 156
Pursuant to Resolution 1441, UNMOVIC and IAEA in-
spected various suspected weapon locations in Iraq throughout
Reflect Fissures in Administration, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at A25 available at
LEXIS, The Washington Post, December 5, 2002.
154 Karen DeYoung, For Powell, A Long Path to a Victory; Pragmatism, Persis-
tence led to 15-0 U.N. Vote, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at Al available at LEXIS,
The Washington Post, November 10, 2002; see E.J. Dionne Jr., The Herky-Jerky
Approach, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2002, at A33 available at LEXIS, The Washington
Post, November 15, 2002.
155 Winthrop, supra note 79, at 47.
156 See generally Neil MacFarquhar, Iraq says U.N. Teams have found no
Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at A10 (col. 6) available at LEXIS, The New
York Times, January 3, 2003; see Foreign Desk, Report on Nuclear Quest: "Clarifi-
cation' is needed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A10 (col. 5) available at LEXIS, The
New York Times, January 10, 2003; see also Michael R. Gordon, Agency Challenges
Evidence against Iraq Cited by Bush, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 10, 2003, at A10 (col. 1).
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2002 and 2003.157 The controversy began in January 2003,
when Hans Blix, the Chief on the U.N. inspectors, stated in a
briefing to the Security Council that they had not located any
evidence that would suggest that Iraq has been producing nu-
clear and biological weapons. 158 In the words of Hans Blix, the
inspectors have not yet located the "smoking gun."1 59 Yet, this
briefing was only preliminary to the report that UNMOVIC and
IAEA needed to submit to the Security Council on January 27,
2003.160 However, the long awaited report did not provide
much closure.1 61 According to Mohamed El Baradei, the Direc-
tor General of IAEA, "[n]o prohibited nuclear activities have
been identified during the inspections."1 62 He further stated
that although there has been much focus on Iraq's acquisition of
aluminum tubes, there is no evidence that Iraq has used the
tubes for nuclear weapons. 163 He also addressed "dual use"
materials, which can "be used in nuclear weapons production
but also have other legitimate uses."164 He stated that the find-
ings, with regard to the materials, have been inconclusive.16 5
Moreover, he stated, "[w]e have to date found no evidence that
Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since its elimina-
tion of the program in [the] 1990s.1166
The United States' response to the lack of evidence was va-
ried. At times, the Bush Administration focused on the fact
that Iraq resisted and interfered with the inspectors and that
Iraq's written declaration on its weaponry was misleading and
incomplete. 6 7 In support of this assertion, the United States
157 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
158 See Foreign Desk, Word on Gas and Germs: No 'Smoking Gun' Found, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A10, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, January
10, 2003; see Editorial Desk, The Iraq Dossier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A22,
available at LEXIS, The New York Times, January 10, 2003.
159 See id.
160 See U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
161 See News Services, No 'Genuine Acceptance' of Disarmament, Blix Says,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A14.
162 Id.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 News Services, No 'Genuine Acceptance' of Disarmament, Blix Says, WASH.
POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A14.
166 Id.
167 See Richard W. Stevenson & James Dao, Bush says Iraqis are Still Re-
sisting Demand to Disarm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS,
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placed great emphasis on Hans Blix's report, which was also
submitted on January 27, 2003.168 His report criticized Iraq,
"[Iraq] appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not
even today - of the disarmament .. ,"169 He stressed the fact
that Iraq's declaration, pursuant to Resolution 1441, was mis-
leading and contained many discrepancies on the amount of its
weaponry.170 Furthermore, he stated that Iraq did not allow
UNMOVIC and IAEA to interview key government officials. 171
At other times, the Bush Administration presented its own
evidence that Iraq had the capacity to produce biological and
nuclear weapons. 172 As stated above, President Bush cited the
United States' evidence of Iraqi weaponry in his State of the
Union Address.' 73 Furthermore, Colin Powell addressed the
Security Council on February 5, 2003.174 In this 2003 address,
he cited intelligence reports (taped conversations and satellite
footage), which revealed the following: (1) Iraq has deceived
UNMOVIC and IAEA; (2) Iraq has made efforts to develop mo-
bile weaponry labs; (3) Iraq's efforts to develop both nuclear and
biological weapons; and (4) Iraq's link to Osama bin Laden, a
terrorist leader.175
France, Russia, and China did not find the UNMOVIC and
IAEA or Colin Powell's presentation as a basis on which the
United States should preemptively attack Iraq.' 76 Their main
The New York Times, January 22, 2003; see also Michael Gordon, To U.S., Onus is
on Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York,
January 24, 2003; Julia Preston, Inspectors set terms for Talks with Baghdad, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 1, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, February 1,
2003.
168 News Services, supra note 161, at A14.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See id.
172 Foreign Desk, Powell's Address, Presenting "Deeply Troubling" Evidence on
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times,
February 6, 2003.
173 President's State of the Union Address, supra note 114.
174 Secretary of the State Colin Powell's Address to the United Nations Secur-
ity Council (Feb. 5, 2003) available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2003117300.htm.
175 Michael Gordon, Powell's Case Against Iraq: Piling up the Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A10, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, February 6,
2003.
176 See Dominique De Villepin's Address to the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (Feb. 5, 2003) available at LEXIS, The New York Times, February 5, 2003; see
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emphasis was on providing UNMOVIC and IAEA with more
time to conduct their inspections. 177 The United States and
Britain responded by urging the Security Council to pass a reso-
lution that would allow for a military attack. 178
Although the Security Council did not pass such a resolu-
tion, the United States declared war on Iraq on March 19,
2003.179 In the months following the United States' occupation
of Iraq, the United States' pre-war evidence on Iraq's supposed
nuclear and biological weapons was seriously questioned.180 To
date, the United States has not discovered any weapons of mass
destruction or biological weapons in Iraq, nor has the United
States presented evidence on Iraq's links to Al Qaeda.181 As a
result, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been
conducting an investigation of the Bush Administration's han-
dling of pre-war intelligence on Iraq since June 2003.182 The
Committee has been examining, "the quantity and quality of
U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction pro-
grams, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to sta-
bility and security in the region. . . ."183
Specifically, the Committee and the media have questioned
the legitimacy of certain statements in President Bush's State
of the Union Address of January 28, 2003.184 In his State of the
also Igor Sergeevich Ivanov's Address to the United Nations Security Council (Feb.
5, 2003) available at LEXIS, The New York Times, February 5, 2003; Chinese For-
eign Nimister Tang Jiaxuan's Address to the United Nations Security Council
(Feb. 5, 2003) available at LEXIS, The New York Times, February 5, 2003.
177 Id.
178 Richard W. Stevenson & James Dao, U.S. and Britain Press for Resolution
on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times,
February 4, 2003.
179 David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Threat and Responses: The White House;
Bush Orders Start of War of Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, March 20, 2003.
180 James Risen et al., After the War: Weapons Intelligence, In Sketchy Data,
Trying to Gauge Iraq Threat, N.Y. TiMES, July 20, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS,
The New York Times, July 20, 2003.
181 Id.
182 James Risen, After the War: Oversight; Senate Panel strikes Deal on Inquiry
into Iraq Arms Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at A8, available at LEXIS,
The New York Times, June 21, 2003.
183 Id.
184 See James Risen, Bush Aides now say Claim on Uranium was Accurate,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at A7, available at LEXIS, The New York Times, July
14, 2003.
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Union Address, President Bush stated, "the British government
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa." 18 5 In March 2003, the
IAEA reported that, "the documents that formed the basis of
this statement were forgeries." At first the Bush administra-
tion acknowledged the inaccuracy of this statement.18 6 How-
ever, Senior Bush officials defended the statement and blamed
the CIA and the British government for their failure the provide
President Bush with accurate information.18 7 Although the
Committee has not issued a final report, there is some indica-
tion that the Committee will be critical of the Bush Administra-
tion and CIA's gathering and presentation of pre-war
intelligence. 188
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States' bombing of Iraq in 1993 has not broad-
ened the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to the extent that
the United States had a basis under international law for its
war against Iraq. The international community's negative reac-
tion to the Iraqi War is an indication that international custom-
ary law still requires a country's act of anticipatory self-defense
to contain the elements of necessity, immediacy, and propor-
tionality. For example, the U.N. and various European and
Middle Eastern countries implicitly questioned the necessity of
the Iraqi War when they insisted on additional U.N. resolutions
and inspections. Furthermore, the international community, as
well as the United States Senate still adheres to the concept
that a threat must be imminent in order to justify anticipatory
self-defense.
There is another indication that the 1993 bombings have
not radically changed the concept of anticipatory self-defense.
The debate that occurred between the United States and France
in the months preceding the war is analogous to the debates
that occurred during the Nuremberg Trials and Nicaragua v.
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United States. Even though the participants have changed, the
actual debate has not changed much. The United States ad-
heres to the idea that it has an inherent right to determine its
anticipatory self-defense measures, whereas France believes
that the United States should be constrained by international
law.
Finally, the United States acted unilaterally when it
bombed Iraq in 1993. President Clinton did not engage the in-
ternational community, the U.N., nor the United States govern-
ment in a constructive dialogue about the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense. As a result, President Bush could not
rely on a prior framework for negotiating with the U.N. Presi-
dent Bush wanted the Security Council to pass a resolution that
allowed the United States to attack Iraq if it did not comply.
This demand was met with a great deal of confusion, and fight-
ing arose among members of the Security Council and among
President Bush's cabinet members. In the end, the United
States acted unilaterally against Iraq without the authority of
international law and without establishing a negotiating frame-
work for future presidents.
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